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Abstract 
This pape~ ~oaks at the public benefit test under the 
Commerce Act 1986 . It examines the criteria of the 
public benefit test and reviews a number of cases where 
authorisations have been sought under the Commerce Act 
and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust Cth) . The 
policies and purposes of the public benefit test are 
then examined. The test is shown to be an expression o~ 
both economic and populist policies, cons istent wi~t tta 
intention of the legislatu~e, and in keeping with New 
Zealand's competition law history. The optio~ of 
providing defined public be~efits are e::a~ined alo~g 
with the option of an efficiency test: t~is part of the 
paper discusses the recent review of the public ~enefit 
test by the Review Team of the Ministry of Commerce. 
The analysis emphasises the importance o f the current 
debate about the proper direction of New Zealand's 
competition law: that is, whether wider economic and 
social objectives should be pursued through retention of 
the present public benefit test or whether narrower 
economic efficiency theories should determine the 
outcome of authorisations by setting efficiency off 
against competition. 
Statement on Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, 
headings, footnote s , and bibliogr aphy) comprises 
approximately 13,500 words. 
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THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST REVISITED 
Introduction 
Part V of the Commerce Act 1986 permits the Commerce 
Commission to authorise certain restrictive trade 
practices ("RTPs") and prohibited business acquisitions 
if the public benefit arising from the practice or 
acquisition outweighs its anti-competitive effects. At 
present the only statutory assistance given the parties 
and the Commission when applying this public benefit 
test is in section 3A of the Act (inserted by section 4 
of the Commerce Amendment Act 1990). 1 
In a recent review of the Commerce Act it was stated 
that 2 : 
"The nature of the public benefit test is crucial 
because it defines the extent to which 
anticompetitive behaviour can be authorised." 
One of the issues examined in the review was the 
ambiguities of the public benefit test ("the PB test") 
in its present form. The cases in New Zealand, and 
under the similar test in the Australian Trade Practices 
Act 1974, show a variety of approaches to the PB test . 
This paper first describes the PB test (Part 1), then 
looks at examples of the PB test in application (Part 
2), and then considers the PB test in the context of the 
policies and purposes of the Commerce Act (Part 3). Th e 
1 Section 3A provides that the Commission is to 
" ... have regard to any efficiencies ... " that may 
result or be likely to result from the RTP or 
business acquisition. 
2 Review of the Commerce Act 1986: Discussion 
Document. Competition Policy and Business Law 
Division, Ministry of Commerce, Wellington. 
December 1991. 
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purpose of Parts 1 and 2 is twofold. First, the PB test 
will be explored in detail, in order to establish its 
limits. Secondly, the underlying policy and purposes of 
the PB test may then be identified in Part 3. It will 
be seen from this analysis that the PB test reflects a 
recognition in the Commerce Act of the limits of 
competition. The PB test will be seen to reflect the 
mix of economic, social and political objectives that 
underly the Commerce Act. Efficiency will be 
established as only one of these objectives, and this 
will be manifest from the examination of the 
Parliamentary Debates on the Commerce Act, from the 
cases and from the very nature the PB test, which 
implicitly recognises that competition and efficiency 
are not always complementary. Populist views about the 
limitations of excessive concentration of market power, 
about the distribution of resources in society, about 
protecting small enterprises from predatory behaviour 
and about preserving stable economic and social 
structures will be seen as relevant, both from the 
examination of the cases involving the PB test (see Part 
2), and from the relevant literature on the policy of 
competition law in New Zealand. 
This analysis will then be drawn upon in a discussion o f 
the merits of the PB test, which investigate s the 
options for redefining the PB test along with an 
assessment of its usefulness as a integral part of New 
Zealand's competition law (Part 4). Both populist and 
economic policies will be established as relevant to the 
question of redefining the PB test. Part 4 proposes 
that, while the Commerce Act remains in its present 
1a1 
3 
form, the PB test should not be limited to efficiency 
criteria alone. The reason for this is that, in its 
present form, the PB test appropriately reflects all of 
the economic and populist objectives of the Commerce 
Act. 
At bottom, this paper is about the proper direction of 
competition law. The debate about the proper direction 
of competition law is generally expressed in terms of 
two broad schools of thought (neo-classical economics 
versus populist economics). 3 The main elements of this 
debate appear frequently in American antitrust writing. 4 
The populist position is that antitrust law should 
ensure that market behaviour is consistent with the 
attainment of all of the economic and social benefits 
that should be available in a democratic and competitive 
market environment. This includes concepts of fairness, 
control of illegitimate market power, and the fostering 
of distributional values, as well as economic 
efficiency. The neo-classical position, championed most 
notably by the "Chicago School", 5 is that antitrust law 
should be restricted to considerations of economic 
efficiency: this is to be achieved by intervening only 
3 See Michael E DeBow "The Social Costs of Populist 
Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective" 14 Harvard 
Jn of Law & Pub Pol 205 for a useful summary of the 
opposing positions. 
4 See Bork, Bowman, Blake and Jones "The Goals of 
Anti-Trust: A Dialogue on Policy" 65 Colum L Rev 363 
(1965) and more recently EM Fox and LA Sullivan 
"Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are 
We Coming From? Where Are We Going?" 62 NYU L Rev 93 
cf FE Easterbrook "Workable Antitrust Policy" 84 
Mich L Rev 1696 (19 86). 
5 Well known proponents of this School of thought 
being Judges Posner, Bork and Easterbrook; see RA 
Posner "The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis" 
127 U Pa L Rev 925 (1979) for a summary of their 
views. 
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minimally in the free flow of market forces. 6 This 
debate is at the heart of the analysis of the PB test in 
this paper. The cases and literature discussed herein 
will establish that, while the Commerce Act remains in 
its present form, populist objectives are both relevant 
and appropriate considerations when determining public 
benefit issues. 
PART 1 
THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST DESCRIBED 
The Commerce Amendment Act 1990 made certain changes to 
the authorisation provisions of the Commerce Act. 7 A 
brief summary of the law as of October 30 1992 follows. 
The PB Test in Authorisations for RTPs 
Authorisations of RTPs falling within section 27 or 
section 28 of the Commerce Act are determined under 
subsection 61(6) of the Commerce Act. Subsection 61(6) 
provides, in summary, that an authorisation of the 
relevant RTP is not to be granted unless the Commissi o n 
is satisfied that the RTP will result or be likely to 
result in a benefit to the public which would outweigh 
its actual or likely anti-competitive effects . 
Authorisations of RTPs falling within section 29 of the 
Commerce Act are to be determined under subsection 
61(7), and those RTPs falling within sections 37 or 38 
of the Commerce Act are to be determined under 
subsection 61(8). Both subsections 61(7) and 61(8) 
6 A view shared by the New Zealand Business Roundtable 
- see its submission on the Review of the Commerce 
Act dated 14 January 1992, Ministry of Commerce, 
Wellington, New Zealand. 
7 See Commerce Amendment Act 1990, sections 19-24. 
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5 
provide that the RTP is not to be granted an 
authorisation unless it will result or be likely to 
result in such a benefit to the public that it should be 
permitted. 
It will be noted that the test for authorisation under 
subsections 61(7) and 61(8) is worded differently to the 
test in subsection 61(6). Subsections 61(7) and 61(8) 
do not specifically require a weighing of public benefit 
against competitive detriment. Nevertheless, the 
Commission has decided that it is appropriate that any 
net public benefits be balanced against the net anti-
competitive effects arising from the RTP in question. 8 
The PB Test in Authorisations for Prohibited Business 
Acquisitions 
An application for authorisation of a prohibited 
business acquisition9 may be granted if the Commission 
'' ... is satisfied that the acquisition will result, or 
will be likely to result, in such a benefit to the 
public that it should be permitted ... II 1 0 Formerly, 
the Commerce Act required the Commission to determine 
whether any public benefits from a merger or takeover 
outweighed the anti-competitive effects arising from the 
8 
9 
10 
Re New Zealand Stock Exchange, Commission Decision 
No. 232, 10 May 1989; following Application by 
Obadiah Pty Ltd (1980) ATPR 40-176. The ambiguity 
created by the different wording may be suggestive 
of a need for consistency because, notwithstanding 
the Commission's view that the test to be applied 
is essentially identical (the merits of this view 
cannot be discussed in this paper), there remains 
some doubt whether in fact a broader test of public 
benefit was intended under subsections 61(7) and 
61(8): see also n 11 below. 
That is, a proposal that has not been granted a 
clearance under sections 66 or 67. 
Subsection 67(3)(b) of the Act. 
6 
acquisition or strengthening of a dominant pos ition in a 
market. This amendment again raises the issue of 
whether a broader public benefit test is envisaged by 
this different wo rd ing. The Commission has recently 
suggested that consist ency in wording between the tests 
be adopted. 11 
The Process of Determining an Authorisat ion 
Ahdar 12 has diagrammatically represented the 
authorisation process for RTPs . 13 The important aspect 
o: this process is the determination of net public 
benefi ts when the so-called balancing process is 
undertaken (note that competitive detriment is also 
netted against positive competitive effects).
14 In 
respect of public benefits, the net gains have to be 
determined in respect of the benefits actually claimed. 
1:1._ Seen 8 above, and Commerce Commission Submissions 
to Ministry of Commerce: Re Commerce Act Revier,1. 
Ministry of Commerce, Welington (1992). Compare the 
Australian tests, ins 90 of the Trade Practices 
Act, which, in resrec~ of both RTP's and business 
acquisitions, permit authorisation if "in all the 
circumstances " such a benefit to the public is 
found to warrant authorisation. 
12 R J Ahdar "The Authorisat.ion Process and the Public 
Benefit Test" in R J Ahdar (ed) Competition Law and 
Policy in New Zealand (Law Book Company, Sydney, 
1991). 
13 Above n 12; see also (1988) 16 ABLR 128, 136. 
14 The process is described by the Commission in Re 
vleddel Crorm Corporation Ltd ( 198 7) 1 NZBLC (Com) 
104,200; the weighing of net competitive detriments 
is a threshold exercise before moving to the stage 
of balancing since, for example,if under s 27 there 
is no substantial lessening of competition, then an 
authorisation is not required . 
7 
A recent example of this netting process is the 
Telecon~ 5 case, where the efficiencies arising from 
telephone network designs and reductions in overall 
costs in running the network were accepted by the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal as being efficiencies to 
the public's benefit16 (the Commission discounted these 
benefits owing to substantial foreign ownership of 
Telecom - the Courts disagreed with this conclusion1 7 ) . 
The High Court netted out these benefits, inter ali a, 
against the loss of allocative and dynamic efficiency 
tha t would result and f ound that the n e t b e nefit s we r e 
outweighed by the competitive detriments. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court's 
assessment, viewing the inefficiencies found as too 
ephe meral, and finding the efficiencies to be sufficient 
to justify an authorisation. 18 However, the Court of 
Appeal's judgment has added little to the learning o n 
the PB test. After Richardson J emphasised the 
importance of the high threshold of the dominance test, 
the respective judges pro c eeded to disagr e e about 
whether that threshold was reached. 19 
In practice the weight attached to any public benefit or 
detriment depend s upon the opinion of the Commis s ion as 
to the significance of the proje c t ed benefit or 
detriment, given all of the c i r c umst ance s s u r r ound i ng an 
15 Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission 
(1991) 
.., NZBLC 102, 340 ( HC); [1992] 3 NZLR 429 .) 
(CA). 
16 Above n 15, 102, 388 - 102, 389.(HC); 435, 439 (CA). 
17 Above n 1 5 , 102, 386 and 102, 389 ( HC); 435, 439 
(CA). 
18 Above n 15 I 438 - 439 (CA). 
19 Above n 15, 434, 435 445-446; see further 
discussion of this case at pp 20-26 below. 
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application. The Commission, 1n the Telecom case, 
succinctly summarised this point in the following 
terms 20 
"Neither detriments nor benefits are easy to 
quantify ... In the end, however, uncer tain and 
incomplete dollar values are not the only items to 
be weighed. There are unquantified but 
nevertheless real changes in outcomes, and 
qualitative factors, which must also be taken into 
account. The Commission must, as a matter of 
judgement, reach a view on the relative weighting 
to give to all of the various competitive 
detriments and public ben e fits identified as 
relevant to its decision, and make that judgement 
accordingly." 
The Meaning of "Public Benefit" 
In Weddel Crown the Commission discussed the scope of 
the word "public 11 21: 
"As to the meaning of the 'public', it seems clear 
from the preamble of the Act that 'public' refers 
to the New Zealand public. Further, the term is 
wider than simply consumers. It could extend to 
various trade interests such as manufacturers, 
wholesalers or retailers, as well as users, 
investors and so on." 
20 Telecom/Crown, Commission Decision No. 254, 17 
October 1990: cited with approval by the High Court 
in NZ Dairy below n 26. 
21 Above n 14, 104,213. 
9 
The High Court, in the Telecom case, adopted the 
following statements of the Australian Trade Practices 
Tribunal 2 2 : 
"Before a benefit (or detriment) can properly be 
regarded as a benefit (or detriment) to the public 
for the purposes of the assessment of public 
benefit required ... , it must be seen as a benefit 
(or detriment) to the community generally ... That 
assessment will ordinarily involve the 
consideration of whether the community generally 
has an interest in the individual or group being so 
benefited or disadvantaged and whether the benefit 
or detriment involves detriment or benefit to other 
individuals or groups." 
Following Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association 
Ltd, 23 the Commission in Weddel Crown said that the term 
"public benefit" is to be given a large and liberal 
scope 24 : 
"The Act is worded broadly and there appears to be 
no limitation as to the nature of the public 
benefit which may be claimed ... A benefit is 
something of value to the public. 11 
In Fisher & Paykel v Commerce Con~ission25 the scope of 
"public benefit" was said in the High Court to include 
flow-on benfits to the public arising from private 
benefits, including" ... second and third tier 
22 Above n 15, 102,383, citing In re Rural Traders Co-
operative (WA) Ltd (1979) ATPR 40-110, 18,123. 
23 (1976) 25 FLR 169. 
24 Above n 14, 104,213. 
25 [1990] 2 NZLR 731, 767. 
10 
effect[s] ... II identified in The New Zealand Co-
operative Dairy Co Ltd v Commerce Commission. 26 
It has been noted that the fact that public benefit is 
undefined by the Act'' ... allows the Commission ... to take 
into account a very wide range of possible benefits. 1127 
The Ministry of Commerce's recent Discussion Paper 28 
notes the following significant facto~s in applying the 
public benefit test 29 : 
-evidence of causality 
-quantification of the benefits clai~ed 
-objective verification of the benefits claimed 
-evidence show~ng the likl~hood that the be3efit will 
fact occur 
- r 
.L --
The Commission has generally given less weight ~o non-
economic benefits, and more weight to improved 
efficiencies, while the Court has occasionally been 
willing to take account of issues relating to the 
distribution of benefits among the public. 30 The 
distribution factors taken account of by the Courts will 
be examined in the discussion of the relevant caseE 
below. 
26 [1992] 1 NZLR 601. 
27 Above n 2 I 6. 
28 Above n 2. 
29 Above n 2 I 13. 
30 See N z Dairy case, above n 26, and he Tell"'C'Oirl 
case, above n 15, (HC). 
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PART 2 
EXAMPLES OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST IN APPLICATION 
This Part looks at examples of the PB test in 
application, in respect of authorisations for RTPs and 
for business acquisitions. A number of decisions of the 
relevant Commissions, Tribunals and Co urts, in New 
Zealand and Australia, will be examined f o r the purpose 
of elucidating v a rious aspects of the PB test that will 
be relevant to the discussion in subsequent parts o f 
this paper. 31 Each case discussed is preceded by a 
heading, which indicates the points to be illustrated in 
the discussion of the particular case . 
Examples of RTP Authorisations 
The Role of Efficiency Ar@ments in RTP Authori sat i ons . 
In Re New Zealand Kiwifruit Exporters Associati o n 3 2
 an 
authorisation was sought for a price fi x ing arrangeme nt. 
In its decision the Commission stated33 : 
II .the Commission may asse s s, pursuant t o a ppl y i ng 
the "public benefit" test, whether an agreement 
which lessens c o mpe ti t i o n i s mo r e efficient tha::1 
the competition which wo uld or c ould o c cur if the 
agreement did not e x is t ." 
31 See van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition 
Laws (2ed CCH Wellington 1991) and J D Heydon Trade 
Practices Law (Law Book Company Sydney 1989) for 
further examples. 
32 Re New Zealand Kiwifruit Exporters Association 
(Inc) - New Zealand Kiwifruit Coolstorers 
Association (Inc) (1989) 2 NZBLC (Com) 99-523. 
33 Ibid, 104,500. 
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The Commission then discussed a number of earlier cases 
that considered efficiencies. It relied on its earlier 
statements in GFL/Wattie, 34 where it said (in 
GFL/Wattie) 3 5: 
"The Act ... appears to rest on the premise that th e 
interaction of competitive forces will yield the 
best allocation of New Zealand's economic 
resources . .. unless it is shown ... that possession of 
a dominant posit ion is better able to achieve 
economic efficiency." 
The Commission concluded that RTPs could be authorised 
on efficiency grounds. However, they also clarified 
that 3 6 : "This is not to say that efficiency is the only 
public benefit which can be taken into account." 
The Commission then went on to make some impor tant 
statements about the place of efficiency arguments under 
the PB test (with respect to RTP authorisations). 37 Its 
conclusions are summarised as follows: 
1. Parliament's intention was clear in following the 
Australian legislation (the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth)) - accordingly the PB test was to be 
given a wide meaning, as in Australia; 
2. Theory and experience justify a presumption in 
favour of competition: however, if it can be 
proven that an RTP will enhance efficiencies and or 
give rise to other public benefits then this 
presumption can be rebutted; 
34 Decision No 212, Commerce Commission, Wellington. 
35 Above n 32, 104,500. 
36 Above n 32, 104,501. 
37 Above n 32, 104,501 - 104,504. 
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3. Efficiency is not a one-sided concept -
inefficiencies arising from an RTP must be taken 
into account; 
4. Efficiencies may be counted when they only benefit 
produceis if they represent a genuine resource 
saving; 
5. There are different kinds of efficiencies that may 
be considered: 
- allocative efficiencies, being better allocation 
of resources; 
- productive efficiencies, being efficiencies 
arising from reduced costs and increased 
economies of scope and scale; 
- innovation efficiencies, allowing better research 
and development; 
- management efficiencies, resulting from 
rationalisation and combined expertise. 
6. Efficiency must be viewed overall and also over 
time, so that it is not merely a static evaluation. 
Public Benefits other than Efficiencv in RTP 
Author i ? a _tj._o_rr§. 
In The Ne11r Zealand Grape Growers Council Inc3 8 an 
authorisation was sought for the collective negotiation 
and fixing of prices and other terms of supply between 
grape growers and processors (wine makers). 
----------
38 Decision No 263, Commerce Commission, Wellington, 
1991. 
14 
The Commission looked particulary at the nexus between 
the public benefits claimed and the RTP. One of the 
main public benefits claimed was that the RTP would 
allow price stability in the wine market, overcoming 
price peaks and troughs caused by the seasonal nature of 
the grape industry. 39 The Commission said that price 
stability was not a public benefit in itself, and that 
it may in fact dull the effective operation of market 
forces. This could lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources owing to the absense of effective price 
competition. 40 Accordingly, what was argued in the 
public interest was from another view a further 
restriction on competitive behaviour, which the Commerce 
Act says, as a matter of policy, is not in the public 
good. 
Other public benefits considered by the Commission 1 n 
this case were41: 
1. Equality of bargaining power betw e en suppliers -
this was rejected, but the Commission thought that 
it could be a public bene fit where there was a 
monopoly buyer .: 
2. Greater information exchange - not thought 
significant, but the Commission thought it could be 
a public benefit where it led to more competitive 
negotiating; 
3. Orderly industry development - not necessarily a 
public benefit and in many cases would be highly 
anti-competitive. 
------- ----
39 Above n 38, 28-29. 
40 Above n 38, 27, 29-33. 
41 Above n 38, 28-29. 
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Public Benefits Must Be Substantial and Be Proved to 
Benefit the Public 
In Re Southern Cross Beverages Pty Ltd42 the Australian 
Trade Practices Tribunal reviewed the relevance of 
private benefits to the public benefit test in the Trade 
Practices Act 1974. 43 The Tribunal noted 4 4: 
1. Before a benefit can properly be ~egarded as a 
public benefit it must be seen to benefit, at some 
level, the community as a whole; 
2. The encouragement or enabling of individuals to 
pursue legitimate ends, if it can be sho wn to be in 
the interest of the community as a whole, can be a 
public benefit but proof of a wider benefit must be 
shown; 
3. Any detriment to the public arising from the 
benefits conferred on the individual must also be 
weighed. 
42 (1981) ATPR 40-242. 
43 Professor Robert Officer, in a paper 
delivered on 12 July 1987 to the Trade Practices 
Workshop (Melbourne), claims that efficiency is the 
goal of the Trade Practices Act, and the Commerce 
Act, and that accordingly private benefits that 
increase overall efficiency in a market should be 
counted as public benefits. However, the argument 
that efficiency is the sole objective of the 
Commerce Act is rejected below, owing to the 
uncertainties of the economic theories underpinning 
it and the policy underlying the Commerce Act. 
Professor Officer's argument that, fundamantally, 
the Commerce Act is concerned with producing a 
"bigger pie" is simply not sustainable in light of 
the analysis that will follow in Part 3 below. 
44 Above n 42. 
16 
In this case, while the Tribunal found that the 
installation of glass-doored soft-drink refrigerators 
benefited the consuming public and the individual 
merchandisers (through rent subsidies), the tying of the 
supply of soft-drink to the supply of the refrigerators 
did not sufficiently benefit the consumer, either by way 
of price savings or through easier viewing of soft-
drinks at the point of sale. It was not certain that 
any rent saving would be reflected in product pricing, 
and the point-of-sale convenience to the public was 
thought minimal. 45 The benfits claimed were ephemeral, 
and were not sufficiently proved to be of benefit to the 
relevant sector of the public (i . e. consumers of soft 
drinks) . 
Public Benefits Must Not Be Attainable by_Otper Pro-
Competitive Means 
In United Permanent Building Society Ltd46 authorisation 
was sought for a RTP of tying insurance to mortgages. 
The Australian Trade Practices Commission discussed the 
following public benefits clairned47 : 
1. Mortgage protection was guaranteed, which had the 
benefit of reducing the overall cost of mortgages 
owing to the increased security against losses; 
2. Cheaper premiums could be offerred, since payments 
could be incorporated with the mortgage finance 
repayments; 
45 Above n 42 
46 (1975-1976) ATPR (Com) 16-825. 
47 Ibid. 
I I 
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3. The mortgagee could pay premiums should any 
payments be missed, thereby reducing the incidence 
of non-payment, the risk of loss and consequently 
the cost of the insurance. 
The Commission found that benefits 1 and 3 may amount to 
substantial public benefits, and that 2 could also if 
the practice was part of a group insurance scheme. 
However, it was not thought that there were significant 
cost savings overall, since the costs of administering 
the scheme were likely to off-set the benefits. Of most 
importance, it was found that the benefits could be 
enjoyed by other means without the countervailing anti-
competitive effects. 48 Nevertheless, the decision 
foreshadows the possibility that, where no viable pro-
competitive alternatives to an RTP exists, the RT? may 
be authorisable on the grounds of the overall savings to 
consumers arising from the RTP. 
Industrial and Community Harmony May be Arguable as a 
Public Benefit. 
In Re Lamont49 the Australian Trade Practices Tribunal 
reviewed a determination of the Trade Practices 
Commission which had declined to authorise a proposal 
for uniform carting charges. The main public benefit 
claimed was industrial harmony, based on the assertion 
that uniform charges would remove any possibility of 
disagreements over charges between independent 
carriers. 50 The Tribunal accepted that in some cases 
industrial harmony may be a substantial public benc~~t. 
It stated that labour market realities should not be 
48 Above n 46. 
49 Re Lamont on behalf of armer-drivers in the Pre-
mixed Concrete Industry (1990) ATPR 41-035. 
50 Ibid, 51,524. 
Ill 
1111 
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ignored and that a method of setting rates, if it 
demonstrably decreased the liklihood of industrial 
disputes, could be a public benefit. However, the 
Tribunal thought that this was a "nebulous" public 
benefit that was difficult if not impossible to 
quantify. 
Historical evidence of industrial relations could only 
provide a rough guide t o the future and there was always 
the possibility that the benefit would not in fact 
occur, because of some other disputatious issue that may 
arise and cause disruption. 51 
The above RTP cases indicate that: 
1. Efficiencies are often powerful public benefit 
arguments, if qualified (Re NZ Kiwifruit); 
2. 
3. 
There are a wide range of efficiencies that may be 
arguable, particulary if the public benefits 
claimed are presented in terms of the ultimate 
economic effects of the RTP (Re NZ Kiwifruit, 
Un.ited Permanent); 
Benefits to individuals, if they entail flow-on 
savings to the public or;~ it is in the public 
interest that an individual be free to pursue a 
particular RTP, can be public benefits (Re Southern 
Cro.ss); 
4. Benefits directly flowing to the parties to an RTP 
that may result in better service to the public, or 
a better labour market environment , may be arguable 
if sufficiently proved (Re Lamont). 
51 Above n 49, 51,525. 
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These elements gleaned from the above RTP cases may be 
compared to the public benefits that are considered in 
the business acquisition cases discussed next. The range 
of benefits considered and found by the Commission in 
the above cases clearly show that efficiency is not the 
only relevant consideration that may arise under the P3 
test for RTP authorisations, and that wider public 
benefits can be significant. 
Authorisations of Business Acquisitions 
Two recent well publicized New Zealand business 
acquisition authorisations, The New Zealand Dairy and 
the Telecom cases, are carefully examined in this 
section. Apart from being the leading New Zealand 
cases, both cases illustrate the limits of efficiency 
arguments ar-d the importance of wider considerations in 
the application of the PB test. 
The fundamental propositions regardi ng business 
acquisition authorisations have been recited above. 52 
Preservation o-F Local Industry and the Role of Po_litics 
In New Zealand Dairy the Commission was asked to 
authorise a me~ger between the New Zealand Dairy Co Ltd, 
the country's largest dairy comp3ny, and a major dairy 
company in the Waikat o and Bay of Plenty. After 
considering the position o: New Zealand Dairy, the 
acquiring company, in a range of relevant markets, the 
Commission found New Zealand Dairy to be dominant in the 
relevant raw milk and town milk supply markets. The 
52 See pp 5-8 above, including an introductory 
discussion of the Telecom case. 
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Commission also thought that the acquisition would 
increase New Zealand Dairy's dominance in these 
markets. 53 
Four public benefits were claimed by New Zealand 
Dairy54 : 
Payout enhancement to farmers; 1. 
2. Inc reased internati ona l competitiveness; 
3. Avoidance o f farm failures; 
4. Avoidance of commun i~y disharmony. 
The Commission found tha~ the enhanced payout would only 
accrue to a narrow band of the public (Waikato dairy 
farmers ) . It rejected the contention that there would 
be an automatic link between the increased payout and 
increased spending in the community, and gave this 
benefit little weight. 5 5 
Under the second claim, New Zealand Dairy argued that a 
combined entity would produce efficiencies in the 
industry as a whole owing to increased competition 
effects on ot her dairy companies. The combined entity 
would enjoy lower costs of processing a nd distribution 
through plan t rationalisations, which would in 
turnenhance the industry's international 
competitiveness. Th e Commissiorc rejected this claim of 
increased international competitiveness by finding th?.t 
the Dairy Board was a price-taker on the international 
market. 56 It then said 5 7 : 
53 Decision No 264A .. Commerce Commission, Wellington, 
23 May 1991. 
54 Ibid, para 15.01. 
55 Above n 53, para 15.04. 
56 Above n 53, para 15.07. 
57 Above n 53, para 15.08. 
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II .. internal dairy company cost savings will serve 
to increase compa~y profitability, but will have no 
influence on export prices which are determined 1n 
the international marketplace... . For the 
Commission to accept any public benefits under this 
category would amount to double counting. The 
benefits have already been taken int o account in 
the section on Payout Enhancement." 
By the time the case came before the High Court the 
Minister of Commerce had conveyed a policy statement to 
the Commission under section 26 of the Commerce Act. 58 
This statement conveyed the need to protect the industry 
from fragmentation in crde~ t o enhance jts ability to 
compete abroac.5 9 
After the Court, on appeal, received further evidence 
from the Dairy Board, it concluded when overturning the 
Commission's decision60 : 
"It is thus our view that improved farm, factory 
and export efficiency will have a compounding 
effect with benefits in improved product, increas e d 
volume of product and an increase in domestic and 
export earn ing s . Thes e benefits will in our view 
--------
58 Section 26(1) provides: 
"I n the exercise of its powers under this Act, the 
Commission shall have regard to the economic 
policies of the Government as transmitted in 
writing from time to time to the Commission by the 
Minister." 
59 See [1992] 1 NZLR 601, 610-611. 
60 Ibid, 635-636. 
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flow through to rural communities and ultimately 
will be nefit New Zealand consumers, albeit 
indirectly. . . . We do :;-10t thi'.'lk ~:1at it matters so 
much to identify, or that it is pos sible to 
identify, where precisely each dollar of savings 
resulting from increased efficiency will fall. But 
this does not mean that each of thes e items of 
p~blic benefit sho uld not be ide nt ified and given 
we ight." 
Ev idence a tuu ~ ~~ e hi s t o r y o f increasing concentration, 
and the technological and scal e efficiencies resulting 
therefrom, influenced the Court' s v i ew of the 
acquisitio n casting it in the context of a natural trend 
towards concentration in the industry as a whole. 61 
The Commission, after the Court's decision, released a 
discussion paper on the milk indu~try, s uc h wa s its 
concern abcut the competitive situation in the 
industry. 62 
While the Commission rejected as insubstantial th e 
benefits in avoiding farm failures by allowing the 
acqui s ition, 63 the Court disagreed and considered that 
61 Above n 59, 635. 
62 Prompted in part by the anti-competitive 
environment created by the Milk Act 1988: see Tom1 
Milk: Competition, Prices & Regulation. A 
Discussion Paper. Commerce Commission, Wellington, 
1991. 
63 Above n 59, 636. 
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the benefits to be gained from stability within the 
farming sector, including the avoidance of insolvencies 
and unemployment and the consequent waste of resources 
and disruption, were significant . 64 Th e "failing 
company " doctrine argued in support o: the merger was 
rejected as a doctrine, the Court declining to adopt it 
as proof of public benefit per se. 65 Nevertheless, the 
underlying elements of that doctrine, that it is against 
the public interest to allow a company to fail when a 
merger will save it and its employees' jobs, were given 
significant weight. In contrast to the Commission's 
finding that the anti-competitive effects of the merger 
clearly outweighed the public benefits, the Court 
authorised the merger, finding that the public benefits 
" substantially outweiged" the anti-competitive 
effects. 66 
The Limits of Efficiency Analvsis and the_ Role of 
"Economic Doctrine" 
In Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v The Commerce 
Commission,6 7 a majority of the Court of Appeal, 
comprising Cooke P, Casey J and McKay J, determined that 
Telecom would strengthen its dominant position in the 
mobile phone market if it qere granted the right to use 
the AMPS-A radi o frequency. 
64 Above n 59, 636. 
65 Above n 59, 616: the "failing company" doctrine 
is said to be " ... a long established, but 
ambiguous, doctrine under which an anti-competitive 
merger may be allowed because one of the merging 
firms is 'failing'. (US Dept of Justice Merger 
Guidelines (1982). 
66 Above n 59, 639. 
67 [1992] 3 NZLR 429. 
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The full Court then decided that Telecom should be 
authorised to acquire the right to use the AMPS-A 
frequency. The principal public benefits found were the 
efficiencies to be enjoyed by Telecom in the provision 
of cellular phone services. 68 
The leading judgment in respect of Telecom 1 s appeal 
against the High Court's finding on authorisation was 
given by Cooke P. Beginnning by noting that 11 I do not 
find the [balancing] exercise at all easy 11 , Cooke P 
signalled that he was to differ with the High Court and 
the Commission on the application of the public benefit 
test. The main elements of his findings of fact are 
listed as followsG9: 
1. The transition to digital technology is necessary 
to enable Telecom to improve its service and meet 
competition; 
2. The users of Telecom 1 s [cellular] service will 
benefit if AMPS-A and AMPS-B can be operated in 
tandem; 
3. Significant economies are likely to occur if 
Telecom acquires the right; 
4. Telecom will face 11 int ense competition ... before 
long 11 and that BellSouth will be a 11 formidable 
competitor as __ soon as it is in business. 11 (wri ter 1 s 
emphasis); 
5. There is a risk that Telecom and Ee l1South could 
collude [seemingly, contradicting 4 above]; 
6. In the foreseeable future there are likely to b0 
three participants in the cellular market; 
68 Ibid, 437-439. 
69 Above n 67, 437-439 
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7. The prospect of any competitor commencing 
operations on the AMPS-A frequency, if available, 
are remote; 
8. Telecom has a 11 ••• legitimate need for the band and 
could be in operation very quickly." 
Cooke P's findings numbered 4 and 6 above contradict his 
earlier finding that Telecom was not dominant, since his 
findings that there was a prospect of "intense 
competition" and "formidable competition" are 
inconsistent with his and Richardson J's assessment of 
the threshold test of dornina~ce. 
Cooke P then said, in relation to section 3A of the 
Commerce Act 70 : 
"Parliament has expressly directed in s.3A that 
efficiencies are to be taken into account. In my 
view that direction should not be effectively 
(albeit unintentionally) circumvented by assuming 
inefficiencies on grounds of economic doctrine." 
70 Above n 67, 433, 439; s 3A provides: 
"3A. Commission to consider efficiency - Where the 
Commission is required under this Act t o d e termine 
whether c= not, or the extent to which, conduct 
will result, or will be likely to result, in a 
benefit to the public, the Commission shall have 
regard to any efficiencies that the Commission 
considers will result, or will be likely to 
result, from that conduct." 
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These findings were largely shared by the other Judges 
of the Court, with Richardson J adding the following two 
statements 71 : 
11 
••• the Commission and the Court accepted that the 
relevant benefits and detriments were almost 
entirely efficiency gains and losses. In these 
circumstances the balancing process does not give 
rise to the obvious p~oblems of quantifying and 
then weighing disparate public interest 
considerations." 
11 
••• both bodies [the Commission and the High Court] 
considered that there would be significant 
efficiency gains if Telecom had management rightc 
over both AMPS-A and AMPS-B. In those 
circumstances there is in my view a responsibility 
on a regulatory body to attempt so far as possible 
to quan~ify detriments and benefits rather than 
rely on a purely intuitive judgment to justify a 
conclusion that detriments in fact exceed 
quantified benefits". 
It is to be noted that the e:ficiency considerations 
under section 3A are to a~ply to efficiencies that 
" ... will result, or ,vill be likely to result, ... " 
Unfortunately, neither the High Court nor the Court of 
Appeal clarified the exact scope of section 3A, and they 
gave little guidance on its future application in the 
context of the PB test as a whole, in terms of balancing 
or otherwise. 
71 Above n 67, 446-447. 
I 
1111 
27 
By comparison with the decision of the Court of Appeal, 
the Commission had considered that the following 
detriments would arise from an authorisation72 : 
1. reduction in potential competitors; 
2. foreclosure of the frequency band under which the 
most likely entry into the market could be made; 
3. loss of allocative efficiency, from the liklihood 
of higher prices than if the band was available to 
competitors. 
The High Court concurred with these findings and the 
finding that " ... excess profits may well encourage 
slackness and inefficiency; they may a ls o be used in 
wasteful "rent-seeking" activities." 73 
The Commis sion found the following benefits74 : 
1. 
2. 
Increased innovation and production efficiencies 
(traffic management and network designs); 
Cost savings by avoiding extra captial for the 
expansion of Telecom' s cellular service. 
Both of these benefits were therefore economic 
efficiencies relating to the cost of Telecom expanding 
its present market share and supplying potg_Qtial demand. 
The Commission discounted gains to shareholders owing to 
Telecom's substantial foreign ownership. The Court 
rejected this approach, seeing efficiencies as 
72 Decision No 254, Commerce Commission, Wellington, 
17 October 1991. 
73 (1991) 3 NZBLC 102,340, 102,386. 
74 Above n 72, 36. 
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benefiting the wider public because of the overall 
saving in resources. 75 
The Court of Appeal's reason for overturning the 
decision of the High Court was that it thought that both 
the Commission and the High Court had fai_ed to properly 
quantify and therefore weigh the efficiency detriments 
against the efficiency gains. 
The Court of Appeal also saw the anti-competitive 
effects of the acquisition in a more robust sense than 
did the Commission or th9 ~igh Court. It looked at the 
"likely" competitors that may emerge in the 
"foreseeable future", and then, remarkab]_y, decided 
that, since there would be no other likely contenders at 
that time (that they knew of), that the anti-competitive 
detriment should be considered les s se~icusly. 76 
The Court of Appeal bolstered its positic~ regarding 
potential competitors by reference to the low number of 
competitors 1n other overseas markets, albeit noting the 
differences 1n market sizes. 77 
---- -·---
75 Above n 72, 36 (Commission) n 73, 102, 388. 
Compare the comments of M Pickford in "On the 
Welfare Function of the Commerce Com;;iission" 22 NZ 
Economic Paper 15 (1988) who critisizes the 
Commission for treating efficiency improvements and 
losses assymetrically, thereby favouring the 
interest of consumers. Of course this criticism is 
premised on the assumption that efficiency is the 
main objective of the Commerce Act, which the 
writer disputes. 
76 Above n 67, 439. 
77 Above n 67, 438-439. 
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Cooke P ' s statement regarding " economic doctrine " 
reflected the Court of Appeal ' s ~reference for the 
evidence of anticipated economic efficiencies (having 
been presented with forecasts by Telecom) as opposed to 
the evidence of anticipated inefficiencies. In shor:-., 
the Court was prepared to accept the a~ticipated gains 
but not the anticjpated losses, notwithstanding that 
both positions were based on certain economic 
assumptions and a large measure of extr apo l ation into 
the unc2rt~in future . This finding ignores '' ... the vast 
a:ymmetry of information that exists bewteen parties to 
a merger and t~e comp~tition authorites''. and the great 
incentive the applicant has to gather and present 
favourable data . 78 Cooke P concluded that 79 : 
"The suggested public detriment is theoretical and 
speculative. On the ot her hand there is solid 
ground for holding that there will be economie s and 
that the public will benefit from a more efficient 
Telecom service and a smoother transition to 
digital technology if Telecom is allowed the band." 
Scale _Economies and the Distribution of Public Benefit s 
In Henderson's Federal Spring Works80 an authorisation 
was sought from the Australian Trade Practices 
Commission for Henderson 's to acquire all of the assets 
of a rival company. Henderson's and its rival (to be 
78 See J Vickers and D Hay The Economics of Market 
Dominance (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). 
79 Above n 67, 439. 
80 (1987) ATPR (Com) 50-054. 
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acquired) were the two largest suppliers of suspension 
springs to the Aust~alian automotive industry. After a 
very thorough analysis of the relevant markets, assisted 
by the availability of ietailed figures and market 
statistics on production volumes, capital values, sales 
forecasts a~d customer details, the Commissjon 
considered the following public benefit arguements 81 
1. The need for industry rationaliEatian, particulary 
given existing overcapacity, lack of funds for 
research a~d development and excess plant (detailed 
plans for rationalisation were presented); 
2. The substantiated likelihood of increased 
efficiencies flowing from scale economies; 
3. The flow-on benefits of the established 
efficiencies, being long-term employment stability, 
further resources for research and development and 
improved export performance (this involves an 
element of double counting for if the savings from 
efficiencies are taken into account, then the 
counting of resultant benefits seems unecessary). 
The failing company doctrine was also argued, but was 
given little weight by the Commission. The Commission 
took a similar attitude to that adopted by the Commerce 
Commission in the New Zealand Dairy case. 82 In a very 
thorough decision, the Commission accepted that there 
were obvious benefits from the acquisition, but it was 
concerned about the the market power that the merged 
81 Ibid, 57,148 - 57, 153. 
82 See above n 80, 57, 154 for an explanation of this 
doctrine, but cf the High Court's acceptance of the 
benefits of avoiding company failure in the New 
Zealand Dairy case - above n 59, 635-636. 
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entity would thereby acquire, particulary vis-a-vis its 
customerf:; in the domestic market. 8 3 The Co~Dission then 
decided as a 11 ••• matter of very fine balance... . 11 to 
authorise the merger. 84 It ~s submitte~ ~hat it was the 
importance of the continued viability of the industry, 
and the possibility of its collapse without the merger, 
that tipped the scales 1n favour of an authorisation, 
rather than the potential efficiencies. 
Technolooical Development and_International Trade 
Deve.l .C?.2-DJent as Public Benefits 
In ?letcher Challenge Lta--as the Commission found that 
Fletcher Challenge would acquire dominance in the 
Australian market for the production and supply of 
newsprint if it acquired 25% of the capital of 
Australian Newsprint Holdings. Some of the public 
benefits accepted by the Commission were86 : 
1. Further development of Australia's natural 
2. 
3. 
4. 
resources; 
Incr eased management efficiencies; 
Development of international competitiveness; 
Sharing of technological resources between New 
Zealand and Australian industry; 
5. Improved quality of goods; 
6. Cost savings through better technological 
deve lopmer. ts c1,chievab le by merged entity; 
7. Enhancement of closer economic relations, thereby 
furthering ANZCERTA8 7 . 
83 Above~ 80, 57,159. 
84 Above n 80, 57,160 - 57,161. 
85 (1988) ATPR (Com) 50-077. 
86 Ibid, 57,387 - 57,388. 
87 Australia and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
and Trade Agreement. 
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In respect of the ANZCERTA claim, the Commission said 
that the claimant would have to 11 ••• demonstrate, by way 
of plans for rationalisation or joint development or 
other relevant plans, what is proposed. 1188 
HAintenance of Employment as a Public Benefit 
In ACI Operations Pty Lta"B 9 the Australian Trade 
Practices Commission was asked to authorise the 
acquisition of assets of ACI's competitor, which would 
give ACI a monopoly positio~. Apart f~cm proved 
benefits of increased economies of sale and scope, the 
Commission seriously considered the effects on 
employment of its decision. Taking a similar view to 
that adopted by the Commission in the NZ Dairy case, 
the Commission thought that job losses that ~ight 
result, if the acquisition was not authorised, would be 
off-set by increases in employment between thg two 
competitors. 90 The Commission thought that job losses 
should not, owing to the inevitable responses of the 
market to unfulfilled demand, be 11 ••• sufficient reason 
to justify the granting of an authorisation." 91 The 
Commission further said92 : 
11 In relation to employment the Commission c:::.rrnot 
focus on one commcnity where the im;:ications of 
the acquisition w~ll te felt in other comm~nities 
as well. The Commissio~ must have a broader 
perspective ... and again must also look carefully at 
the longer term ramifications of its decisions." 
88 Above n 8 5, 57,396 - the proposdl ,-;2s a1-: U-:c:::- ised. 
89 (1991) ATPR (Com) 50-103. 
90 Since existing market demand would have to be 
satisfied by the industry, whatever its structure. 
91 Above n 89, 56,089. 
92 Above n 89, 56,088. 
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The cases surveyed show that, while efficiencies may be 
significant in the balancing process under the PB test, 
wider distributional economic and social factors are 
also important. The role of government under section 26 
of the Commerce Act also introduces a political element 
into the PB test. 
The RTP and business acquisition provisions in the 
Commerce Act assume that, when prohibited arrangements 
are entered into, prohibited behaviour is engaged in. or 
dominance in a market is acquired, there will inevitably 
be anticompetitive effects. However, the nature of the 
arrangement, behaviour or industry structure may also 
allow for assumptions that certain benefits or 
detriments will occur . For example, a horizontal merger 
in a capital intensive industry, that :e~mits the 
retirement and upgrading of plant, may inevitably 
produce certain scale economies. The difficulty in 
balancing such factors against wider public detriments 
lies in qualifying such detriments and balancing them 
against efficiency projections . 
It has been shown that the PB test is not simply about 
efficiencies. Wider public welfare issues 1 such as 
unemployment, industrial disruption, consumer welfare 
and the loss of export industries are important. 
Efficiency analysis does not yield an answer to the 
question of the desirability of considering such w~der 
detriments. Ncr is it possible to dete~mine this issue 
based on the outcomes of the cases, since the merits of 
each case are, in hindsight, al~osl impossible to 
objectively assess. 
Accordingly, in order to fully assess lhe merits of t e 
PB test and its alternatives it is necessary to examine 
the above issues in the light of the policies underlying 
the Commerce Act. 
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PART 3 
THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST AND 
THE POLICY AND PURPOSES OF THE COMMERCE ACT 
Competition as a Policy Objective 
The preamble to the Commerce Act states that it is: 
"An Act to promote competition in markets within 
New Zealand and to repeal the Commerce Act 1975." 
93 
The Report of the Commerce and Marketing Committeee on 
the Commerce Bill stated94 : 
"The Bill will help to ensure that competition and 
freedom in the market-place become a reality." 
In his statement during the introduction of the Commerce 
Bill the then Minister of Trade and Industry said95 : 
"The Bill represents a key part of the Government's 
policy to improve the performance of the economy 
and to restore and maintain long-term growth." 
Later, he spoke about the purpose of the Bill96 : 
'' ... the Bill is designed to redu_e prices by 
increasing competitio __ in the market-place and by 
prohibiting price rigging arrangements, price 
fixing arrangements and other trade practices 
93 Th e Commerce Amendment Act 1991 amended the Act to 
include trans-tasman markets in some cases - see 
sections 3(1B), 3(1C), 4(2) and 36A of the Commerce 
Act. 
94 See NZ Parliamentary Debates Vol 468, 19 85 : 8594. 
95 NZ Parliamentary Debates Vol 463, 1985: 4681. 
96 Ibid, 4685-4686. 
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that restrict competition. That is the basic 
purpose of the Bill, ... the purpose of the Bill 1s 
to give the consumer a fair go so that the market-
place operates effectively and prices are reduced." 
Other comments about the Bill, made during the second 
readi n g, were : 
" In tandem with other changes, the Bill increases 
efficiency in the New Zealand economy . In 
particular, it will help to ensure that the 
benefits of a freer economy will not be frustrated 
by private restrictions in the market-place." 97 
" The legislation introduces safeguards for groups 
that are affected by the deregulation that the 
Government is carrying out, suet as in the wheat 
industry. People operating in that industry wanted 
an assurance that there would not be moves towards 
monopolization within the industry." 98 
In their article on the Commerce Act, Stevens and Round 
selected the following statements made by the then 
Minister of Trade and Industry during the introduction 
of the Bill9 9: 
"The t"\c-:, which is aimed at ensur 1ng that 'the 
conditions for workable and effective competiti o n 
exist and that the benefits of increased economic 
efficiency and growth are enjoyed by all members of 
the community including consumers,' ... 
97 NZ Parliamentary Debates Vol 469: 506. 
98 Ibid, 512. 
II 
99 L L Stevens and DK Round "The Commerce Act 1986 -
A Legal and Economic Commentary Upon Some 
Fundamental Concepts" [1987] 12 NZULR 231, citing 
NZ Parliamentary Debates Vol 463: 4681. 
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Later, the authors stated10 o: 
"The policy reflected in both the Australian Trade 
Practices Act and the New Zealand Commerce Act 1s 
that competition is a social and economic good to 
be encouraged while at the same time proscribing 
non-acceptable business practices." 
They then conclude101 
"There is really no single purpos-2 behind sc.:c::i 
legisla~ion. Rather, it reflects conflic~ing social 
a~d political interests which interact with 
economic issues in society. It comprises a mixture 
of ideological motives and distributive (welfare) 
goals, as well as the desire for competitive 
markets." 
This view was echoed in the ~ecent Re view o f the 
Commerce Act1 o 2 : 
"A competition threshold provides a yardstick for 
behaviour which is accessible to the business 
community, and encourages business to behave in a 
way which creates wide-ranging benefits for the 
co:nmunity." 
The Limits of Competition Policy 
Friedmann has not ed that103 
100 Ibid, 233; in a note (n 14) the author$ comment 
'' ... that it will generally be economically 
inefficient to pursue competition at all costs." 
101 Above n 99, 233. 
102 Above n 2, 6. 
103 W Friedmann Law in a Changing Society (2 ed Penguin 
1972), 308. 
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"The basic problem of anti-trust is the definition 
of the public policy criteria which balance the 
value of cooperation against the benefits of 
competition. This is as perenial a problem as it is 
elusive. Nor can it be answered in absolute terms." 
In particular, the promotion of competition will not 
necessarily yield the most economically efficient 
outcome. 104 Moreover, as we have seen, efficiency is but 
one policy goal of the Commerce Act. Those who claim 
that economi c efficiency is the ultimate objective of 
the Co~~erce Act base their claim more on ideologica: 
desir~ than on legislative intention . Further, econo~ic 
efficiencies are not easy to define or measure . The 
certainty that is sought in +heories of economic 
efficiency ignore the possibility that concepts of 
economic efficiency may not be limited to the 
traditional categories of productive, allocative, and 
technical ef:iciencies. 105 
Melsheimer has said, in relation to the role of economic 
theory in antitrust 1 D6: 
104 See D F Greer Efficiency and Compelition: 
Alternative , Complementary or Conflicting 
Objectives (NZIER Research Monograph 47 1989). 
105 For example, the context in which economic 
efficiencies may be considered will vary from that 
of a company, to an industry, to a nation or to a 
world-wide context . Efficiencies at one level may 
produce inefficiencies on another: for example. 
efficiencies of mass production in a industry may 
produce environmental costs that, in the long run, 
are inefficient. On a more mundane level, 
production efficiencies gained from increased 
economies of scale after a merger may be 
accompanied by managerial inefficiencies : see 
Corones below n 154, 296-299. 
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"Stripped of ideology, economics is a tool - one 
tool - for understanding antitrust issues, not a 
method of explaining away e ve ry practice, sim~l8 or 
comple,:, that arguably impairs the competitive 
process. Economics assists decisionmakers in 
understanding the real world compe titive process. 
It a science, not a slogan. 
destination. 11 
It is a vehicle, not a 
Indeed, these sentiment s have been supported so~ew1a~ ty 
one of the main proponents of the Chicago School; Posner 
says that1° 7 : 
11 Since economics yield s no answer to the question 
of whether the existing distributio~ of income and 
wealth is good or bad, just or unjust (although it 
may be able to tell us a great deal about the costs 
of altering the existing di str ibution, as well as 
the distributive consequences of various policies), 
neither does it answer the ultimate question of 
whether an efficient allocation of resources 
[according to the model of efficiency adopted] 
would be socially or ethically desirable. 11 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the opinion that efficiency 
is at the core of the Commerce Act, 103 the fact remains 
that it is the promotion of competitio~ that is the 
expressed objective of the Commerc e Act. This objective 
is understood to yield a variety of results, apart from 
106 T M Melsheimer 11 Economics and Ideology : Antitrust 
in the 1980s 11 42 Stanford L Rev 1319, 1335 (1990). 
107 RA Posner Economic Analysis of Law (3 ed Little 
Brown & Co Boston 1986) 13. 
108 See J G Collinge '1Determining Public Interest Under 
the Commerce Act: A Review To Date" (unpublished 
paper , Commerce Commission , Wellington 1987) 5. 
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efficiency I incl uding 1 0 9 : "freedom in the market-place", 
reduced prices, giving the consumer a "fair go", 
safeguards fer smaller producers as well as the 
elimination of unfair business practices (for example, 
price fixing and resale price maintenance). 
Clearly, the range o f outcomes that may occur by virtue 
of the competition policy pursued by the Commerce Act 
will not always be consistent with increased economic 
efficiency in a given ma rket. 
The Public Benefit Test and the Limits of Competition 
The adoption of the PB test arguably reflects a 
recognition that a competitive market structure and 
competitive market practices are not always desirab~e. 
The inclusion of section 3A in the Co~~erce Act 
implicitly recognises the divergence o~ competition and 
efficiency objectives. This is further support, in the 
context of the PB test, that the Commerce Act is not 
solely aimed at efficiency since, if this was the sole 
underlying objective, there would be no need for section 
3A. 
A review of the history of American antitrust law shows 
that, through the maintenance of competition under the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, competition would 
provide the primary safeguard against the rise and 
increase of monopoly power and unfair trade 
practices. 110 Populist goals were thought to be as 
important under the American legislation as were any 
underlying efficiency objectives. This may be compared 
to prevailing monopolies and merger policy in the United 
109 See above pp 31-32. 
110 See D Millon "The Sherman Act and the Balance of 
Power" 61 So Cal L Rev [1988] 1219. 
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Kingdom, which was reviewed in 1978, and expressly 
recognised the disadvantages to consumers of monopoly 
pricing and anti-competitive ~arket behaviour, despite 
efficiences.111 The content of the debates over the 
Commerce Bill show that objectives relating to the 
control of market power and the prevention of unfair 
practices were significant aspects of the policy 
underlying the Commerce Act. 112 Rev:sionist thinking 
that says the ultimate intention of the legislature was 
to promote efficiency alone simply does not coincide 
with the facts. 
We have seen that the PB test is wide, allowing a 
variety of factors to be weighed by the Commission when 
considering an authorisation. The undesirable outcomes 
that may result from the pursuit of competition at all 
costs are recognised by the very existence c! tte PB 
test. This is not to say, however, that the P5 test 
exists solely to rectify inefficient outcomes flo~ing 
from the anticompetitive provisions of the Commerce Act. 
Sosnich's comments on competition policy objectives 
apply equally to the objectives of the PB test11 3: 
"If the sole function of competition 1.=r.·1 was the 
maximisation of co~sLmer welfare by advancing thg 
most efficient allocation of resources and by 
reducing costs as far as possible, the for2ulation 
of legal rules and their applicati on would be 
------- ------
111 A Reviei·l of Nonopolies and Herger Policy . Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office. Cmnd 7193 (1978), 12-
15. 
112 See pp 34-35 above. 
113 Sosnich "A Critique of Concepts of Workable 
Competition" 72 Qu ,J Ee (1958) 380. 
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relatively simple... . In reality however different 
policy objectives have been pursued in the name of 
competition law, many of which are not rooted in 
notions of consumer welfare in the technical sense 
at all, and some of which are plainly inimical to 
the pursuit of allocative and productive 
efficiency." 
Accordingly, since efficiency is not the sole goal of 
the Commerce Act, similary it cannot be the sole goal of 
the PB test. ~conomic efficiency is but one of a number 
of important objectives of the Co~merce Act, and is 
therefore but one of the objectives t o be considered 
when applying the PB test . 
Th e policy of the PB test can perhaps bes be stated as 
one of flexibility of approach. The PB test allows 
those who seek authorisations for RTPs o~ business 
acquisitions a wide raDge of possible arguments to 
support their case. Public benefits are not restricted 
to theoretical gains arising from projected economic 
efficiencies. Of course, this 1s a two-sided equation, 
and the public detriments that may be weighed are 
equally unrestricted. 
Having considered the provisions of the Commerce Act, 
the policies underlying those provisions, ane examples 
of the polici es and provisions in applicati.on, it 1s now 
appropriate to revisit the PB test with a view to 
answering the question of whether a redefinition of the 
PB test is appropriate. 
rn 
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PART 4 
IS A REDEFINITION OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST REQUIRED? 
The foregoing discussion of the PB test shows it has 
been given a large and liberal interpretation, in 
accordance with the broad objectives of the Commerce 
Act. However. this has not meant that spurious or ill-
defined benefits, such as greater community harmony, 114 
have been allowed to fig~re significantly (at least, not 
,. t-' ' a1rec, .,_y, . 
The PB test has now been refined considerably in the 
decisions of the Commission and the courts. Applicants 
for authorisations now have sufficient indication of the 
sorts of p~blic benefits that are arguable, but at the 
same time are aware that the category of acceptable 
benefits is not closed. The heart of the PB test in 
practical terms is whether sufficient proof of a public 
benefit can be shown: this necessarily weeds out 
speculative or dubious claims. 
At :irst sight therefore, and if the policy objectives 
recited in this ?aper are accepted, it would not appear 
that there is any pressing need for modification of the 
PB test . I r: : 2.ct, the majority of subrni ss ions made to 
the Ministry of Commerce in its r e cent revie~ o: the Ac~ 
supported the status quo. 115 However, s ome strongly 
argued that the test should be limited to benefits 
flowing from efficiencies. 116 
114 Such as were argued 1n the NZ Dairy case, above 
n 53. 
115 Above n 2, 9. 
116 Above n 2, 9. 
' ' 
11 
43 
The answer to the question of the desirability of a new 
or redefined PB test depends upon the maters that are 
considered to be the proper focus for the authorisation 
process, and the appropriate weight to be given to the 
sorts of publ:c benefits considered desirable. 
The Options for Redefining the PB Test 
In its Discussion Paper, the Commerce Act Review Team 
identified two main approaches to the PE test117: 
1. to consider a mix of eccnomic efficiency and other 
factors relating to p""clblic b-9nefit ( "':.:-ie ·.-;ider 
test"); 
2. to consider economic efficiency alone ("the P-arrower 
test"). 
The wider test could also include ~~~ of defined 
benefits -this is discussed further below. The Review 
Team thought that the wider test would alow for the 
consideration of anything of value to the community 
generaly, i~cluding economic benefits.118 In contrast, 
the narrower test would only promote economic 
efficiency, other public interest issue~ raised bv the 
RTP or acquisition being left to the government to 
remedy by other means.119 
117 Above n 2, 14. 
118 Above n 2, 14. 
119 Above n 2, 15. 
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Flexibility in approach , adaptability to differing 
circumstance s and cases, responsiveness to community 
demands a~d consideration of distribution values were 
identified as characteristic of the wider test. 
However, it was noted that the need for value judgements 
to be made by the Commissi o n and the Court may lead to 
uncertainty and some inconsistency. 120 
Furthering the achievement of industrial objectives and 
an established methodology were seen as t~e p8sitive 
aspects of the narrower test, but it was noted that 
there is no established juri3p~utence o~ sue~ 2 test and 
that adoption of the test would:.assume that savings to 
producers were more important than savings to 
consumers. 121 
The central issuE underlying all of the proposals in the 
Discussion Paper is whether it is desir able for the 
Commerce Act to continue to pursue competition as i~s 
prime objective, rather than to pursue efficiency and/er 
other objectives. 
The option of creating a list of defined benefits will 
be considered next, and then the option of Jimiting the 
PB test to efficiency will be investigated. 
120 Above n 2, 15 : compare the decision of the 
Commission in the NZ Dairy case with that of the 
Court, for example: See above notes 53 and 59 . 
121 Above n 2, 15. 
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A List of Defined Benefits 
The Discussion Paper suggests that '' ... tta Government 
c ould pr o v i d s the Commission with guidance on matters t o 
be treated as benefits. 11 122 The Discussion Paper then 
suggests that ranking of benefits could be made and tha t 
cat e g o ries of individuals and groups who qualify a s the 
"public" could be defin8c1. Howe v e r, a s the Dis c u s sion 
Pa.per notes, 123 " . .. a list can not an t icipate the full 
range of business situations tha t might 3. r is e in 
relati o n to individual appJ.ications." 
Und e r se ction 80 of the Commerc e Act 197 5 th e Commission 
was allowed to consider, in addition to defined public 
benefit criteria, "Any other effects aiding the well-
being cf the people of New Zealand; . . . 
II While such a 
"wrap-up" clau s e initi a lly seems an at t :-act ive 
proposition, it would make the provisio n o f defi~ed 
criteria less useful, ~:nee the PB test wo u ld i n 2 ff ec t 
be opened up to its present scope. The provision of a 
definition of the "public" could lead to a gre a t deal o f 
uncertainty in interpretation while jurisprudence on the 
question develope d. 12 4 The advocates for a list of 
benefits wished the Commission to give more weight to 
non-eco nomic factors. If such matters are accepted a s 
1 ') ') 
.1-~ ~ 
123 
124 
Abo ve n 2, 16. 
Above n 2, 16. 
Examples of the problems vague definitions can 
cause may be found in Lindsay v Cundy (1876) 1 QBD 
348 and in Wakefield Board of Health v West Riding 
Rly Co ( 1863) 6 B &. S 794. In the later case 
Cockburn CJ observed: "I hope the time wi 11 come 
when we shall see no more of interpretation 
clauses, for they generally lead to confusion." 
Such confusion could arise for the reasons given by 
the Court of Appeal in Telecom, above n 67, 434 , 
where Cooke P highlighted the cicularity of merely 
paraphrasing the meaning of terms in relation to 
dominance. 
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being ones which should be g~ven greater weight, then 
the provision of a list, even with a "wrap-up" clause, 
may serve a usef:11 purpose. 3owever, it is possible now 
fo~ the governmeLt to use section 26 of the Act to 
transmit its desire for certain economic policies to be 
considered by the Commission. 125 While section 26 does 
not expressly expressly include social policies, it does 
give some score for wider economic policies relating to 
the distribution of wealth to be transmitted to the 
Commission. On the other hand, a list would be contrary 
to the apparent policy shift represented by the adoption 
of section 3A. The Commission would be bound to g1~e 
more weight to listed criteria, thereby possibly 
weakening the impact of efficiency arguments (although 
these too could be listed. and perhaps guidance on 
weighting could be given). The actual application of 
such criteria in the balancing process would not be any 
easier, and any weighting could only be in the form of 
general dir~ctions as to importance. 
Those who object to the present wider test, and who 
would object to an extended definition of public 
benefit, do so, inter alia, because of the wider public 
detriments that would also be potentially examinable. 
S~ch detriments could off-set beneficial 
efficiencies,126 and may make attaining an 
authorisation less likely than under th e p~eEe~t test. 
125 Section 26 was utilised in the NZ Dairy case 
in somewhat controversial circumstances, the 
communication of the policy being made by the 
Minister of Commerce while an appeal was pending; 
presumably distributional economic policies cou_d 
also be communicated. 
126 As occurred when the Commission and the High Court 
turned down Telecom's application - see above 
pp 23-25. 
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A PB Test Based on Efficiencies Only 
This was considered as option (c) in the Discussion 
Paper.12 1 This approach envisaqes what the Discussion 
Paper described as 11 ... a partial equilibrium 
analysis. 11128 That is, the analysis would only take 
account of direct efficiency gains or losses flowing 
from the RTP o= business acquisition . Factors such as 
higher output, better quality output, reduced marginal 
costs arising from higher productivity and improved 
innovation would be ce~tral benefits to consider. 129 
The converse of these factors would be weighed to obtain 
a net efficiency quota to weigh against the net anti-
competitive effects of the proposal. 130 
The Act presectly recognises that competition and 
efficiency will not always be complementary (by allowing 
the Commission ~o have regard to efficiencies flo~ing 
from an anti-competitive activi~y). The frequent 
divergence o f efficiency and competition has long bee~ 
recognised by economists . 13 1 Owing to this divergence, 
127 Above n 2, 17; a " general equilibrii.:.m" test wa5 
also considered, which is a test allowing 
consideration of Kider economic factors, but it was 
thought that such a test differed lictle from the 
present PB test and would not necessarily achieve 
efficiency goals. 
128 A~ove n 2, 17. 
129 See cases discussed in Part 2 above for examples. 
130 Above n 2, 15. 
131 See for example Feldman " Efficiency, Distribution, 
and the Role of Government in a Market Economy" 9 .J 
Econ Lit 785 (1971) and Bork, Bowman, Blake and 
Jones above n 4 and more recently, and in the New 
Zealand context, see Bollard The Economics of the 
Comme~ce Act (NZIER 1989) and Greer above n 104 . 
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an assessment of which objective should prevail in any 
given case ea~ be very difficult, as is shown by the 
cases, in both New Zealand and Australia, in which the 
respective Com~issions have had to grapple with the 
balancing of the two criteria.132 
While it may be possible to estimate what costs may be 
incurred or savings enjoyed from an R~? c~ business 
acquisition (although quantifying these is usually very 
difficult), it is beyond the scope of economics to 
decide the question cf whether, in pri~cirle, 
competition s~ould p=evail over efficiency (since this 
is essentially a policy question invclvi~g judgemen~s 
about the social an~ distributive effects of comfetition 
and efficiency). The preso~t PB test per~:t: the 
Commission to make certain policy choices betwee~ 
competition, efficiency and other pu~lic tenefits, in 
individual cases . However, the complexity of 
multidimensional competition, 133 and the di£ficul y :..n 
accurately predicting whether projected efficiencies 
will i n fact occur, can make this deciEion a very 
difficult one to make. Demsetz suggests that " ... these 
techniques [efficiency and competitjon analyses] often 
are rationalized as methods for improving on the 
market ' s ahility to serve consumers." 134 However, ho 
13 2 See for examplo Re Ne1,; Zeal and K.i ·vi fnz.i. t Exporters 
Associatio.1 (Inc) - Ner.,1 Zealand Kirvifrui t 
Coolstorers Association (Inc) (1989) 2 I!ZBLC (Con) 
99-523 and in Australia Pasminco Limited Australian 
Mining & Smelting Limited (1988) ATPR (Com) 50-032. 
133 This phrase is defined as competing through product 
quality, contractual arrangements, and 
institutional innovation, in addition to price 
cornpe ti tion: see H Demsetz II Economic, Legal, and 
Political Dimensions of Competition" in Dr F 
Devries (ed) Lectures in Economics - Theory, 
Institutions, Polic:,t" ( Elsevier Science Publishers B 
V, Amste~dam, 1982), 18. 
134 Above n 133, 58. 
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concludes that " In practice, this may produce solutions 
not tailored well to consumer interest."135 Thus it is 
by no means certain that the public will be any better 
served by substituting an efficiency based PB test. 
Further, Areeda & Turner observe that the United States 
courts1 3 6 : 
"[When] faced with a square choice between a 
competitive market structure and efficiency, 
individually pursued and obtained, . .. have chosen 
efficiency ... Contrary judicial ~tterances are few, 
and either casual , gratuitous or unsuppol-ted." 
There are al ready strong indications thGt efficiency 
as a public benefit will loom large in the futu~e under 
the existing PB test . 13 7 By adopting efficiency as the 
sole criteria i~ the PB test one mi~ht speculate whether 
the main objective of the Commerce Act will, by default. 
shift to efficiency, notwithstanding the Act ' s 
proclaimed purpose of promoting competition. 
Given the potentially s ignificant impact Commission 
decisions can have on the community one wonders whether 
a refinement of the public benefit test is merely 
tinkering with what shou:d be the real questions of : 
1. the appropriateness of competition or effj_ciency 
tests alone for enhanc ing public eco nomic wE::a~~; 
and 
135 Above n 133, 58 
136 P Areeda & D F Turner Antitrust Law (Little Brown 
& Co, Boston, 1978), 9. 
137 See the Fisher & Paykel case, above n 25, the 
Telecom case, above n 67 and the High Court in NZ 
Dairy, above n 26. 
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2. the appropriateness of the Commission making policy 
choices ostensibly in the public inter2st. 
Allied to t~ese questions is the fundamectal policy 
choice betwee~ the pursuit of purely econcmic objectives 
versus populist goals . As presently fra~ed, the 
Commerce Act clearly aims to pursue bott economic and 
populist goals DeBow138 has identified this dichotomy 
in American antitrus thinking, but =on:ludes with a 
sceptica l view of the benefits of continu ing to pursue 
populist goals through antitr~3t. !n particular, h~ 
sees potential for the use of bodies such as the 
Commerce Commission to advance st~ategic and political 
int eres ts , rather then to pursue l egitimate concerns 
over abuse of market power and anti-competitive 
practices. He claims a cost-benefit a~alysis of the use 
of antitrust for populist p~rposes may reveal that 
populist goals are best left to legislation desig~ed 
specifically to address the distributional and welfare 
conc erns that underly the populist concerns. 139 These 
issues are further examined in the text that fo:~o~s. 
Efficiency or Populist Goals - the Narrower or the Wider 
Test? 
The narrower and wider tests broadly mirror the 
1~chotomy be t ween economic and populist goals identified 
by DeBow . 
Melsheime:: has observed that: " Something is going ori in 
anti trust policy " , after which he opines that140 : 
138 Above n 3. 
139 Above n 3, 212-222. 
140 Above n 106, 1335. 
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" .in the hands of Chicago School prcponents, 
economics has become an engine !or ideology hostile 
to the c;3ration of antit~ust lRw. Moreove~, the 
use of economics is ideolog~cally selective. !f 
economic learning can assist in labeling a practice 
procompetitive or, at worst, neut!3l, then such 
learning 1s an appropriate component of the 
judicial process. If the economic learning, 
however, causes antitrust concern, it is toe 
cumbersome for judges to handle. This sort of 
disingenuosness has no place in a rational and 
honest antitrust policy." 
The examin~tion of the cases in Part 2 of this paper 
illustrates to~ populist, or welfare . concerns often 
overlap with economic analysis. For example, in he N ~ 
Dairy case the public benefits argued in favour of the 
acqui s it ion could have been f r amed i~ either pop~list or 
economic t erms. The core benefit argued was the 
maintenance of viable farms, which supplied the Waikato 
Dairy Cooperative. I n pop~list terms, 1t could be 
argued that it was a benefit to the public that these 
farms remain viable, thereby maintai~ing employment 
levels and avoiding social and industrial disruption. 
In political terms, another populist pers~ective, it was 
communicated by the Government that ~t ~as p2~t 2t 
economic policy that the far~ing sector should be 
protected from disruption owi~g to its st~ategic 
significance to the New Zealand economy. 
In efficiency terms, the High Court thought that the 
acquistion would realise significant economies of scale 
and scope, ~h~=h would be vital to the inte1national 
competitiveness of the industry. It ~ill be recalled 
that the Commission and the High Court disagreed about 
the significance of these eff i c i encies , the Commission 
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in particular finding that the efficiencies would not 
significantly affect the international competitiveness 
of a price-taking industry, but would lead to 
significant public detriments from dominance 1n the 
relevant markets. Quite clearly, it was the populist 
factors that determined the outcome of tr:e NZ Dairy 
case. 
Commentary on the Narrower Test 
Advocating efficiency as the appropriate goal of 
antitrust law is the v~~w 0£ these who prcpo~e the 
narrower test. Efficiency proponents share the 
hostility o f the Chicago Schoo: to any a~titrust 
controls: what is needed, says the Chicago School, is 
minimalist controJs, sincP all will be well if the 
market is left to sort itself out throug:-: the "natural" 
flow of free forces.141 Of cour~e, no men tion is made 
of the fact that human bei~gs are usually not rational 
maximisers, and in fact the so-called free f orces are in 
reality economic power wielded by powerfu: business 
concerns and peopJe. The history of antitrust, and 
indeed its very ~ationale, was a re spons e to the failure 
of market forces to yield efficient, rational and fair 
outcomes - why we should have faith in such forces in 
the modern era is not made clear in the theory. 14 Z 
141 See, in the Nr2w Zealand context, these vie\''S 
recounted ir_ S Cave "More more market" N Z Listener-
October 10 1987 and "'!'he Ro· ndta::ile Tilts at ".'.::.e 
Comr.ierce Act" Public Eyes November 1983. 
142 See J Peeters "The Rule of Reason Revisited: 
Prohibition on Restraints of Competition in the 
Sherman Act and the EEC Treaty" 37 the Arn Jn of 
Comp Law 521 [1989] for a history of antitrust law 
responses to market failures; see also H Henderson 
The Politics of the Solar Age - Alternatives to 
Economics (rev ed Knowledge Systems Inc 
Indianapolis 1988) Part Two for a critical 
historical analysis of market based economics. 
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In the United States tha so-caled new era in a~titrust 
policy, which is based c~ the theory that only 
efficiency losses j~stify a per-se prohibition, began 
with Continental TV Jnc v GTE Sylv~~ia.143 This Cc:Se 
narrowed the per-se protibiti~n on vertical practices by 
holding that the rrotibition ~as net ~o apply in the 
absense of deno~strable inefficiencies. The Court 
effectively presu:.:ed ;:;roco:-ipetiti··e o·.:t-:c:ies m.;ing t"J 
the presence of efficiensies (we have already seen ~ ~ 
the two are cot co~relative). 
The Contine~tal TV Inc v GTE Sylvania case ref_ects the 
Chicago Schoel t~inki~g ~~at places efficiency as the 
yardstick for determining antitrust cases (as, inceed, 
al econo~ic issues) -anticornpetitiv~ ~e~a··icur th3t 
does not lead to inefficiencies is net, 2cccrding to 
this Schoel, rele ·ant.144 
However, as has been shown above, the Cc~~erce Act does 
not, in its present forn, have efficiency as ils s ole 
objective. It is not correct therefore to assert that 
an efficie __ cy PB test would complement the Commerce 
Act' s objectives. Further, as the Continental TV case 
ilustrates, an efficiency PB test would inevitably 
narrow the restrictions o~ anticompetitive conduct. 
Given the l:igh threshold for business acqui2i1ions ~nde~ 
the Commerce Act, it is likely that most business 
acquistions -,·c,ul:~ ·:;asily meet the c1.uthori:::it.ior: criteria 
should efficiency benefits and detriments only be 
relevant. 
143 433 us 36 (1977). 
144 That is: "competition is equalized to alocative efficiency and non-economic goals are explicitly 
rejected.. " -see Peeters above n 142, 530. 
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The likely consequences of an efficiency PB test would 
be twofold. Fi::-st, sig:::1ifica::1t aggregat.:.cn o: mar!;:et 
power would be more likely to occur , particulary 1n 
capital intensive i~e~z~::-ies. Secondly, if the 
Commission's views of the efficiency a::-g~~e~ts advanced 
1n NZ D.::iry are .1:1.CC8:?t ed, the role of 11idcr- fact c:rs :.:a-:·i 
be important, but under the narrower test they would be 
irrelevant. Opinions ever the extent and significance 
of efficiencies vary widely fron case to case and 
between finders o f fa c t. 14 5 .n co~zequepce, under the 
narrowe r test, economic cpinion wouli ~rive New 
:ealand ' s competition !a~ . ~otwithstand~~J the broad9r 
policies of the Commerce Act. 
It is submitted that the adoption of the nc~1-r0Fer lest 
would lead to a fundamental shift in policy emphasis 
under the Commerce Act. 
Commentary on the Wider Test 
Peeters has stated, in relaticn to comprtition 
policyl 4 6: 
"It is g ,2 nerally recognised that some re!::tra::.nt.s 
on competition can be useful and therefore should 
be excused. This policy d e cision will be based on 
the goals o f C8mpet:tion p::ic-7. 1' 
145 See the differring opinions of the Commission and 
the Courts in the Telecom case and the N :; D:1iT:.r-
case, above notes 67 and 26 respectively. 
146 Above n 142, 522. 
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Citing Fikentscher, Peeters has identified the following 
grounds on which anticompetitive conduct has been 
accepted1 4 7 : 
1. economic policy - i.e. uphold antico:npet itive 
conduct for economic reason s (efficiencies , the 
"narrower test " ); 
2. legal policy - i . e . uphold anticompetitive conduct 
on legal grounds, such as the so-called de mini~us 
concept1 4 8 .: 
~ socio-political - i.e. protection of sma ll 
producers, consumers, and other societal interests; 
4. political - i.e. the impac t of Government policy in 
other areas1 4 9 • 
Peeters goes on to ncte150 : 
" These last two types of policy rules of reason 
clearly indicate that the goals of competition 
policy can be very broad and do not have to he 
confined to the preservation of competition as 
defined. Dissipation of market po~er, pratection 
of small enterprises, the entrepeneurial frPE~ a~ cf 
retailers and other non-economic goals can give a 
special character to a system of competition la1·1s. 11 
147 Above n 142, 522-523, citing W Fikentsher 
Wirtshaftsrecht 22 III 5(b). 
148 That is, that while there may be a legal breach of 
competition law, the anticompetitive consequences 
are mini~al - this sort of thinking appeared to 
significantly influence the Court of Appeal in the 
Telecom case, see in particular Cooke P ' s judgment 
above n 67, 439. 
149 Compares 26 of the Commerce Act. 
150 Above n 142, 522-523. 
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Retention of the wider test would mean that the Commerce 
Act would continue to have a " special c:1.a!'acter" in the 
sense described by Peeters . 1s1 The need to retain this 
"special cha:::-a c ter" depends upon the policy objectives 
of the legislature, and on the presence of other 
constraints on industry should th e populist policies be 
withdrawn from the legislation . If the laissez-faire 
philosophy of the Chicago School is accepted, then the 
wider test ~s cle a rly, as a ~atter of policy, 
unacceptable.152 If some of the tenents o: the Chir:agc, 
School are accepted, particulary in relation to the need 
to ma;:imise effici0ncies, but some syspathy is retained 
for populist goals, then perhaps the present emphasis in 
the Commerce Act, incorporating section 3A, is an 
acceptable balance.1s3 
The wider test, as already noted, allows the wider 
objectives of the Commerce Act to be realised where 
appropriat e. 1 54 It reflects traditional concerns over 
the societal effects of excess aggregation of market 
power. Given the policies that under:y the Commerce 
Act , it is appropriate, 1n the absence of a full reform 
of the Commerce Act, to retain the PB test in its 
present form. Efficiency has been g1veI'- a~ emphasis by 
the inclusion of section 3A and it is up to the 
Commission and the courts to wisely balacce any 
competing objectives on a case by case basis. 
151 See also R Ahdar "Regulating Mergers 
upon Socio-Political Grounds in New Zealand '' [1986) 
12 NZULR 49 for a summary of socio-political 
reasons for controlling concentration in industry . 
152 Although, if this philosophy prevailed there 
probably would be no Commerce Act at all. 
153 Particulary given the predisposition of the 
Commission and the Courts to efficiency arguments. 
154 See above pp 54ff. 
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Those who call for the narrower test t o be adopted on 
the grounds of certainty and "rational" economic theory 
forget that the wider test reflects the history and 
policy of competition law both in New Zealand 2nd 
abroad . 15 5 From a New Zealand historical perspective, 
one can begin with section 26 of the Board of Trade Act 
1919, which authorised the Governor-General to make such 
regula tions as he deemed necessary in the public 
interest to prevent " t:.nfair " methods of competition and 
methods prejudicial to the public welfare. Later, 
section 19 of the Trade Practices Act 1953 allowed the 
Commission to make orders against RTP's that we~e 
" contrary to the public interest " . The general 
object i ves of the Commerce Act 1975 included the 
promotion of the interests of consumers . and the 
transmitec esonomic policies of governmen~.
156 
Such broad policies are surely best facilitated by a PB 
test that allows all factors to be taken account of, 
particular where future effects must be pred~cted. 
Narrow economic analysis can serve as a model to assist 
the process, but, as Melsheimer notes, it fails to serve 
a useful purpose when it substitutes theory, or to use 
Cookes P ' s words in Telecom. economic doctrine, for 
proper analysis of all relevant policy criteria .
157 
155 See notes 4, 142 and 153 above; and see genera~ly 
Y van Roy Guidebook to Ner,,1 Zealand Competition 
Laws (2 ed CCH NZ Ltd Auckland 1991) chpt 1, S G 
Corones Competition Lar.,r and Policy in . ustralia 
(Law Book Company Sydney 1990), chpts 1 & 2, R 
Whish Competition Law (2 ed Butterworths London 
1989) chpt 1 and LA Sullivan Handbook of the Law 
of Anbl:ust (West Pub Co St Paul 1977) chpt 1. 
156 Sees 2A Commerce Act 1975. 
157 Above n 106, 1335; and see Telecom above n 67, 439 
( per Cooke P) . 
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One factor that has concerned some about the wider test 
is the uncertainties that arise from the variety of 
factors that must, as a matter of policy, be 
considered. 158 One economist has noted this concern and 
offers the following suggestions159 : 
II .in many of the cases seen under the Commerce 
Act [that] I have been involved in or studied. I 
would have liked to have seen a greater discipl:ne 
by expert witnesses i~ the application of the 
public benefit test. Ihis would i~clude 
identifying why and where the seri0~s conflict 
between competition and other polic~es occurred, 
carefully linking the conflict with the (al:e~ed) 
gains from the alternative proposal. and arguing in 
detail a significant balance in favour of the less 
competitive alternative ... Quantitative estimates 
may be helpful, but they can not be concl~sive. 
Anyone with practical experience will know hew 
unreliable the estimates typically are - even after 
allowing that in any case they are r:rospec:ive." 
This call for better quantification of benefits and 
detriments is also made in the Court of Appeal's 
judgment in the Telecom case. 1 6° 
158 Above n 2, 9. 
159 B Easton Submission #31 to the Commerce Act Revie1v 
Team, Ministry of Commerce, Wellington 1991. 
160 Above n 67, 446-47 (per Richardson J). 
• 
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Competition policy analysis is complex. The desire for 
simplicity or doctrinal consistency should not lead us 
to abandon the historical policies underlying our 
competition law in favour of a conveniently less 
demanding economic analysis that ignores established 
policy objectives. The legislature has chosen to allow 
a broad range of factors to be considered under the 
present PB test as a means of arriving at a sensible 
balance between the interests of producers and 
consumers. 
Reasons for the Call for the Narrowe~ ~est 
The calls for a change from the PB test to the narrower 
test are mainly coming from big industry. 161
 The call 
for the narrower test stems, in theory, f~om the 
conflict between the principal policy of the Commerce 
Act, to promote competition per se, and the size-
efficiency dichotomy. 16 2 
The size-efficiency dichotomy arises where it becomes 
necessary, for reasons of capital costs or production 
levels required, for participants in an industry to 
increase firm size until a monopoly or oligopoly exists. 
Accordingly, usually owing to the capital intensive 
nature of an enterprise, competition ~n terms of the 
number of participants may suffer as a result. The 
161 Of the submissions made to the Review Team, of the 
Ministry of Commerce, all of those who favoured an 
efficiency test were, without exception, 
submissions from large industrial or multinational 
enterprises, or their interest groups. 
162 See discussion of this dichotomy in E W Kintner 
Federal Antitrust Law (Anderson Pub Co Cincinnati 
1980) 34-38. 
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difficult question for competition policy is when and 
how to evaluate whether aggregations of market power are 
justified on this basis. As Kintner notes 163 : 
"The significant point here is that monopoly power 
is a relative concept that must be evaluat ed in the 
particular context of an indust:-y and/or market." 
Th e challenge for competition law, and in particular for 
those who must determine authorisations under the 
Commerce Act, is to decide i~ any give~ case whether 
sufficient justifying factors exist fer an 
anticompetitive business acquisition or RTP. 
Friedmann has observed that, when consi~ering154 
II .. the difficulties and contradictions inherent in 
the Benthamite idea of of free trade ... any 
legislature which seeks to establish legal rules 
preventing the consequences of uninhibited 
competition [or control thereof], by which the 
strong may destroy the weak, must establish a legal 
apparatus, often of great complexity. 
dilemma of antitrust." 
This is the 
While it is clear that the size-efficiency dichoto~y 1s 
one of the reasons behind the calls ~or the narrowe:-
test, and that in certain cases t:-e 1-eec.s of efficiency 
are justified, the control of the abuse of market power 
through the regulation of RTPs and business acquisitions 
163 Above n 162, 293. 
164 Above n 103, 302. 
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is of at least equal importance. Ulti~ately, efficiency 
as a justification for aggregation of market power must, 
while the present Commerce Act remains, be balanced 
against the factors that may arise, either as public 
detriments or benefits. The ~ifficulties inherent in 
this process would not necessarily be avoided by the 
~arrower test. 1 65 
Balancing Doctrine and Practice 
In the report of the Standing Committee~= the 
Australian House cf Representa~ives o~ Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, 166 the benefits and costs of 
mergers and takeovers were assessed. The Committee's 
conclusions, after considering all o: the economic 
factors in favo~r of increase~ concentrat~on, and all of 
the potential costs (including detrimental social 
consequences), were that the evidence about the effects 
of mergers and takeovers was inconclusive, 167 and said: 
"On the basis of the se considerations the Committee 
is of the view the competiton policy shou ld nei~her 
actively encourage nor discourage mergers er 
takeovers, but should, as a primary functio~, 
ensure that unacc ep able levels of dominance a~d 
misuse of market power are prevented." 
165 Vickers and Hay, above n 78, 23 who note that there 
are "formidable Difficulties" associated with 
assessing efficiency gains against anticompetitive 
consequences. 
166 Known as t:1e "Griffiths Report", 1989. House of 
Representatives. Canberra, Australia. 
167 Ibid, 15. 
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Ahdar observes that1Ga: 
"Merger control premised upon having to promote 
competition will often satisfy many of the populist 
objections to big business, since the level of 
mergers prohibited ( large scale rr.ergers) are the 
very kind of mergers which also infringe socio-
political values. In this sense the competitio~ 
based approach is compatible with the socic-
poli tj cal approach." 
The maintenance of minimum levels of competition 
proscribed by the Commerce Act j s not al~a y~ c o n s iste~t 
with the most efficient outcomes. Eowever, wher e 
significant efficiencies are created by an RTP or 
business acquisition, an authorisation is likely in the 
absence of excessive anticompetitive effects. 
Nevertheless, detriments t o the public such as 
monopolistic pricing, predatory practices, shedding of 
employment and industry instability may offset 
efficiencies. In circumstances where there are a 
mixture of efficiencies, inefficiencies a~d othe~ pu~lic 
benefits or detriments, the weight attributed to each 
benefit or detriment becomes crucial. 
In both Australia and New Zealand there is a trend for 
efficiencies to loom large in public benefit analys~ s. 
However, cases such as N Z Dairy and United Permanent 
Building Society illustrate that other ~a:t o rs can a~d 
168 Above n 151, 49 citing Areeda and Turner above n 
136 I 18-21. 
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may prov e significant . It is hoped that a balance will 
be maintained between the economic and wider objectives 
of the Commerce Act . PH Clarke observes that16 9 : 
"It is important to appreciate t:iat objectives may 
exis~ at two distinct levels . This is most likely 
to occur in relation to Jegislation like the TPA, 
which engages in soci3! or economic engineering 
where it is not possible to put into legislative 
form the precise end result Parliament wishes to 
achieve." 
Clear recognition and pursuit of all of the policies of 
the Commerce Act will ensure that the social and 
economic " engineering" of the Commissjon and the Courts 
fairly balances the competing interests in the 
community. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It has been observed that1 7 o: 
169 
170 
"The essential first step to any proposal for r:e ·d 
competition legislation is a consideration of the 
objectives which the legislation is designed to 
achjeve. This is especially so in relatjon to 
legislation expressed in very wide and general 
terms." 
PH Clarke "Trade Practices Policy and the Role of 
the Trade Practices Commission" (1989) ABLR 291, 
292. 
T Frazer "Defects and Effects - Competition Policy 
for the 1990s " [1988] 51 Mod L Rev 493, 496. 
I 
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The author then identifies three possible objectives for 
competit i on law111: 
1 . Promotion of economic efficiency1 7 2 ; 
2. Achieving a balance betwee~ effec tive competition 
and other, unrelated, pubJ.i c in::erest 
objectives173 ; 
3. Promotion of economic unity, such as in the EEC or 
in trans-tasman relations . 174 
Despi te attempts by tLe Chicago Schoo::. and ot.he::.·s to 
reduce competition policy and analysis to their own 
narrow ideological framework, the Commerce Act and 
similar antitrust legislation in Australia, Europe and 
the United States, continues to allow for the fulfilmenl 
of populist objectives. Competition law is not simply 
about economic analysis , but also involves '' ... a desire 
to achieve 'f airness ' in commercial dealings . II 1 7 5 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
Ibid, 496-497. 
He adds, at 497: "As interpreted by the Chicago 
School of economists, this approach will usually 
result in a substantial withdrawal of government 
from the market, . . . '' 
He adds, at 497: "An anticompetitive agreement, 
merger or monopoly practice will be permitted if 
its rerr:ova would have adverse effects on such 
interests as employment or the distribut i on of 
industry." 
Compares 36A of the Commerce Act. 
Above n 165, 497; compare extract from 
Parliamentary Debates above n 96 . 
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The laissez-faire vision of a society of rational 
maximisers who partake 1n transactions where no 
externalities exist is so far removed from reality as to 
be almost useless as a model. 176 
Insofar as the PB test is concerned, the adoption of the 
narrower test depends upon 2cce~tance of the economic 
doctrine of the Chicago School. The promotion of 
efficiency as the sole objective of the PB test woul 
undermine all other objec~ives that are cle2rly part of 
the policy behind the Commerce Act. If there were some 
certain reward for t~is sacrifi~e then perhaps sue~ a 
reform would be justified - howeve~, the only certainty 
about it wi.2 ::._ be the fu.rthe:- aggrGgat ion of market power 
in New Zea_and industry. Moreover, as Ahdar notes, much 
of the evidence about the effects of con entration in 
industry are equivocal. 177 
The wider test, which essentially is the present PB 
test, allows for the continued pursuit of all of the 
competition policies enunciated during the Parliamentary 
Debates. To limit the benefits and detri~ents to 
efficiencies would undermine the wider policy objectives 
of the Commerce Act. An efficiency test would open the 
door for New Zealand ' s competition policy to be overrun 
by economic doctrine, often advanced by those who seek 
to strengthen or abuse their market power. 
176 Myrdal has noted that economists have disregarded 
modern psychological research on people ' s behaviour 
as income earners. consumers, rroducers and 
investors because the results of this researct are 
impossible to integrate into their conceptual 
framework - see Henderson above n 142, 166 . 
177 Ahdar, above n 151, 65; and see Vickers and Hay 
above n 165, 13. 
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The present PB test allows the Commissjon and the courts 
to make fair decisions based on the best interests of 
the public at large, while takj_ng accou~t of the 
efficie,,ciPs of any proposal. A body of jurisprudence 
that is flexible enough to cope with an array of 
circumstances has now developed through the application 
of the PB test. 
In these circuDstances, and given all of the policies 
behind the Co~~e~ce Act, it is difficult 'o see how the 
narrower test is either justified or ~~r~an ed . ?or 
these reasons the writer advocates rete~~:o~ of tje P9 
test in its present form. 
I 
I 
I 
BI BL IOGRAPHY 
Ahdar, R.J. "Regulating Mergers upon Socio-Political 
Grounds in New Ze ~land!' [1986] 12 NZULR 49. 
Ahdar, R.J. "The Authorisation Process and the Public 
Benefit Test" in Ahdar, R.J . (Ed). Competition La1v and 
Policy in New Zealand. Law Book Company, Sydney (1991). 
Areeda, P . and Turner, D.F. Antitrust Law. Little Brown 
and Co, Boston (1978) 9 . 
Bork, Bowman, Blake and Jones "The Goalr of Anti-Trust: 
A Dialogue on Policy " 65 Colum L Rev 363 (1965). 
Bollard The Economics of the Commerce Act. NZI:SR ( 1989). 
Cave, S. "~·fo~e, mo~e marke~". NZ Listener (October 10 
1987). 
Collinae, J . G. Determin.ing Public Interest U_'J.c!er the 
Commerce Act: A Review to Date. Unpublishe1 Paper, 
Commerce Commission, WeJlington (1987) 5. 
The Commerce Act (1986). Review and Disc~ssicn Paper. 
Competition Policy and Business Law Division, Ministry 
of Commerce, Wellington (December 1991). 
Commerce Commission. Town ."!ilk: Competi.tic·n, Pr_:ces, and 
Regulation. A Discussion Paper. Wellington (1991). 
Cc:-ones, S . G. Competition Lai\1 and Polic:/ in Australia. 
Law Book Company, Sydney (1990). 
De:Sow, M.E. "The Social Costs of Popu:1..ist Antitrust: A 
Public Choice Perspective" 14 Harvard Jn of Law and Pub 
Pol 205. 
Dems etz, H. "Fconomi c, Legal, and Political Dirr.ens ions 
of Competit::.on" in De Vries, F (Ed) LeC"t:.1:::es in 
Economics - Theory, In s t i ti:tions., P01i :-y. Elsevier 
Science Publ~shers B V, Amsterdam (1982) 18. 
Easterbrook, F. E. "Workable Anti trust Policy". 84 Mier: 
Law Rev 1696 (1986). 
Easton, B. Submission 113.L to the Commerce Act Review 
Team . Ministry of Commerce, Wellington (1991). 
Feldman "Efficiency, Distribution, and the Role of 
Government in a Market Economy". 9 J Econ Lit 785 
(1971) . 
Fox, E.M . and Sullivan, L.A. "Antitrust Retrospective 
and Prospective: Where are we corning from? Where are we 
going? " 62 NYU L Rev 93 . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Frazer, T. "Defects and Effects - Competition Policy for 
the 1990 ' s " . [1988] 51 Mod L Rev 493, 496. 
Friedmann, W. Lavi in a Changing Society. (2ed). Penguin, 
(1972) 308. 
Greer, D.F. Efficiency and Competition: Alternative, 
Complementary or Conflicting Objectives. NZIER Research 
Monograph 47 (1989). 
Griffiths Report, Report of th e Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs House of 
Representatives. Canberra. Australia. 1989 
He~derson, H. The Politics of the Solar Age -
Alternatives to Economics (rev ed ). Kno~edge Systems Inc 
Indianapolis (1988). 
Heydon, J.D. Trade Practices Law. Law Book Company, 
Sydney ( 1989) . 
Kinter, E.W. Federal Antitrust Law. Anderson Pub Co 
Cincinnati (1980) 34-38. 
Melsheimer, T.M. " Economics and Ideology: Antitrust 
in the 1980 's". 42 Stanford L Rev 1319, 1335 (1990). 
Millon, D. "The Sher mar. Act and the Balance of Power". 
61 So Cal L Rev [1988] :21s. 
New Zealand Business ~ou~dtable. Review of the Commerce 
Act. Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, New Zealand. 
(14 January 1992). 
New Zea land Parliamentary Debates. Vol 463, 1985:4681, 
4685-4686. Vol 468, 1985: 8594 . Vol 469: 506, 512. 
Officer, R. (Prof). Paper delvered to the Trade 
Practices Workshop (Melbourne, 12 July 1987) . 
Peeters, J. "The Rule of Rea.son Revisited: Prohibitic.,r: 
on Restraints of Competition in the Sherffian Act and the 
EEC Treaty". 37 the Am Jn of Com::_:> I.,aw 521 L19S9]. 
Pickford, M. " On the Welfare Function of the Commerce 
Commission " 22 NZ Economic Paper 15 (1988). 
Posner, R.A . " The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis". 
127 U Pa L Rev 925 (1979) 
Posner, R.A. Economic Analysis of Law. (3ed) Little, 
Brown and Co., Boston (1986) . 
Public Eyes "The Roundtable Tilts at the Commerce Act ". 
(November 1988). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
A Review of Monopolies and Merger Policy Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office. Cmnd 7198 (1978). 
Sosnich "A Critique of Concepts of Workable 
Competition". 72 Qu J Ee (1958) 380. 
Stevens, L . L. and Round D.K. "The Commerce Act 1986 -
A Legal and Economic Commentary Upon Some Fundamental 
Concepts " 12 NZULR 231 [1987]. 
Sullivan, L . A. Handbook of the Law of Antitrust. West 
Pub Co St . Paul (1977). 
United States of America, Department of Justice. "Merger 
Guidelines" (1982). 
van Roy, Y. Guideb i)ok to I'e:,, Z23.land Cor;;pet.: t ion Laws 
(2 ed). CCH NZ Ltd, Wellington (1991). 
Vickers, J. and Hay, D. The Econom.ics of Harket 
Dominance (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). 
Wl:.ish, R. Compet.i tion Law ( 2 ed). Bu-:: te:: 0.·10:rt::s Lend en 
(1989). 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
AW LI RARY 
1 5 JUL 139/ 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY Of WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
3 7212 00384102 8 
l 
r 
Folder 
Py 
Pyke, Warren 
Claude 
The public 
benefit test 
revisited 

